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Abstract The incomplete contracts literature often cites indescribable contingen-
cies as a major obstacle to the creation of complete contracts. Using agents’ minimum
foresight concerning possible future payoffs, Maskin and Tirole (Rev Econ Stud 66:83–
114, 1999) show that indescribability does not matter for contractual incompleteness
as long as there is symmetric information at both the contracting stage and the trading
stage. This is called the irrelevance theorem. The following generalization of the irrel-
evance theorem is shown here: indescribability does not matter even in the presence
of asymmetric information at the trading stage, as long as there is symmetric infor-
mation at the contracting stage. This is an important clarification because Kunimoto
(Econ Lett 99:367–370, 2008) shows that indescribability can matter if there is asym-
metric information at both stages. It is thus argued that asymmetric information at the
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contracting stage is necessary for indescribability to be important in the rational agents
contracting model.
Keywords Asymmetric information · Bayesian implementation · Incentive
compatibility · Incomplete contracts · Indescribability · Individual rationality ·
Irrelevance theorem
JEL Classification C72 · D78 · D82
1 Introduction
Almost everyone would agree that actual contracts appear quite incomplete. Since the
early works of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), the incom-
plete contracts literature has successfully answered many organizational questions.1
A crucial assumption for this literature is that the two parties cannot write an ex ante
contract which specifies appropriate investment levels, and appropriate asset usage
as a function of every possible contingency. To justify this apparent incompleteness,
the literature often invokes the assumption that, at the contracting stage, agents are
able to forecast their possible future payoffs (this is needed in order to be able to make
rational investment choices before uncertainty is realized.), but state contingent (phys-
ical) actions cannot be described, i.e., are indescribable.2 Maskin and Tirole (1999)
(henceforth, MT) observe that using this agents’ minimum foresight concerning the
possible payoff contingencies, the parties can design a message game at the trading
stage (ex post) that effectively describes all the trades that have not been described at
the contracting stage (ex ante). They show (in their Theorem 1) that when the par-
ties can use such a game and renegotiation is preventable, inability to foresee future
contingencies by itself does not constrain contracting. MT also show (in their The-
orem 3) that when the parties are risk-averse and unbounded transfers and lotteries
can be used, renegotiation together with indescribability does not constraint the set
of implementable outcomes. When the parties are risk-neutral, MT only establish (in
their Theorem 4) that indescribability places no additional constraint on contracting,
but do not rule out renegotiation-proofness constraints.3
The basic idea of Maskin and Tirole (1999) is: if agents have trouble describing
physical contingencies, they can write contracts that ex ante specify only the possible
payoff contingencies. Then, later on, when the state of the world is realized, they can
fill in the physical details. It follows that the only serious complication is incentive
compatibility: will it be in each agent’s interest to specify these details truthfully? But
1 See Tirole (1999) for an excellent survey of this literature.
2 See footnote 4 in Hart and Moore (1990): “…Note that there is no inconsistency in assuming, on the
one hand, that date 0 contingent statements are infeasible and, on the other hand, that agents have perfect
foresight about the consequences of this lack of feasibility …”.
3 In certain environments, Che and Hausch (1999), Hart and Moore (1999), and Segal (1999) show that
optimal complete contracts take the form of “simple contracts”. These works are considered foundations
of incomplete contracts. To be consistent with MT’s irrelevance theorems, these authors do not argue that
indescribability by itself is an essential ingredient for contractual incompleteness.
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implementation theory can be used to ensure that truthful specification occurs in equi-
librium. I consider indescribability as simply a constraint that filling in the “physical”
details is impossible at the contracting stage.4
This paper is primarily concerned with the question of under what conditions inde-
scribability itself is important for contractual incompleteness. Kunimoto (2008) made
some progress in this direction: indescribability can matter when there is asymmetric
information at both the contracting and the trading stages, using the standard com-
plete contracts model otherwise. More specifically, it is shown there that there is a set
of implementable contracts that always induces the ex ante efficient investment and
trade when the states are describable, while only the no-investment-no-trade contract
can be implemented when the states are indescribable. The current paper clarifies the
extent to which indescribability does not matter by extending MT’s irrelevance the-
orem to the environments in which there is symmetric information at the contracting
stage but asymmetric information at the trading stage (See Sect. 4).5 In other words,
I show that indescribability places no additional constraint on contracting by “rational”
agents, but does not rule out Bayesian implementability constraints (See Sect. 3 and
the Appendix). I therefore aruge that asymmetric information at the contracting stage
can result in indescribability mattering for contractual incompleteness. For example,
this asymmetric information might be viewed as the agents’ previous experiences to
the current situation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, I set up the benchmark case
without indescribability. In Sect. 3, I give definitions and notations needed to address
the case of indescribability. In Sect. 4, I establish the main result as the extended
irrelevance theorem á la Maskin and Tirole (1999) in the environments where there is
asymmetric information at the trading stage. Section 5 illustrates those conceptually
complex notions introduced in Sect. 3 and the main result provided in Sect. 4 through
an example. This section also illustrates most of concepts and the results provided in
Maskin and Tirole (1999). Section 6 concludes.
2 The benchmark case without indescribability
2.1 Bilateral contracting
Consider a bilateral contracting environment in which two agents trade goods. There
are four dates in this contractual relationship: At date 1, the agents sign a contract. This
stage is called the contracting stage in this paper. Throughout this paper, I assume that
there is symmetric information at the contracting stage.6 At date 2, the agents make
4 See Maskin (2002) for an illustrative exposition of Maskin and Tirole (1999).
5 In fact, Maskin and Tirole (1999) wrote in footnote 6 in their paper as follows: We conjecture, however,
that the irrelevance theorem extends the case of ex post asymmetric information in the sense that the ex ante
describability or indescribability of states continues not to matter under our assumptions. I will make this
conjecture a formal result because it clarifies the extent to which indescribability does not matter, given the
result of Kunimoto (2008).
6 This is consistent with the incomplete contracts literature. Kunimoto (2008), on the other hand, assume
that there is “asymmetric” information at the contracting stage.
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non-contractible investments. At date 3, each agent only receives his own signal. This
stage is called the trading stage, at which the agents could have “asymmetric” infor-
mation. At date 4, the agents implement the trade specified by the contract.
Let N = {1, 2} be the set of agents. For each agent i ∈ N , let Ti = {τ 1i , . . . , τ kii } be
a finite set of agent i’s types (signals). Let T ≡ T1 ×T2 be the set of states of the world
and T j for j = i denote the other agent j’s type space from agent i’s point of view.
Note that symmetric information at the trading stage can be seen as a special case in
which both agents have the same type space T1 = T2 and it is common knowledge
that both agents always receive the same signal.
Each agent i makes a non-contractible investment ei ∈ Ei . Each pair e = (e1, e2) ∈
E1 × E2 = E gives rise, stochastically, to a state of the world τ characterized by (1) an
action set Aτ and (2) ex post payoff functions ui : A ×T → R. Here A ≡ ⋃τ∈T Aτ .
More formally, let τ˜ be a random vector taking values in T with associated distribution
p over T conditional on e ∈ E where
p(τ |e) = Prob {τ˜ = τ |e} .
I assume that they have prior probabilistic beliefs about states conditional on the choice
of investments and that they share a common prior expressed by the conditional prob-
abilities p(τ |e).
A complete contract can be defined as a mapping f : T → A with the property
that f (τ ) ∈ Aτ for each τ ∈ T .
The contract f induces an investment “game” between the agents in which, given
e = (e1, e2), agent i’s payoff at the contracting stage is
∑
τ∈T
p(τ |e)ui ( f (τ ); τ) − ci (ei ),
where ci (ei ) is agent i’s cost of investment.
I say that the pair (e∗, f ) is feasible if, given a complete contract f , the unique
equilibrium of the investment “game” consists of each agent i selecting ei = e∗i :
1. e∗ constitutes a Nash equilibrium:
∑
τ∈T
p(τ |e∗)ui ( f (τ ); τ) − ci (e∗i ) ≥
∑
τ∈T
p
(
τ |ei , e∗j
)
ui ( f (τ ); τ) − ci (ei )
for all i ∈ N and all ei ∈ Ei , and
2. there is no other equilibrium
Denote by e∗( f ) the unique Nash equilibrium of the investment game associated
with a complete contract f . Let
Aτ = X τ × Y,
where X τ is state-dependent and Y is state-independent. Assume for simplicity that
X τ is finite for any τ ∈ T . For concreteness, I shall assume that the choice of y ∈ Y
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specifies the distribution of money. That is, y = (y1, y2), where yi is agent i’s allotment
of money. The set of feasible allocations Y is given as follows:
Yi ≡ R for all i ∈ N (unbounded transfer is possible), and
Y = {(y1, y2) ∈ Y1 × Y2 | y1 + y2 ≤ 0} .
I shall suppose that ui (·; τ) depends on x and yi only, and that for all τ ∈ T and all
x ∈ X τ , ui (x, yi ; τ) is strictly increasing and continuous in yi in the feasible set Yi .
In what follows, I focus on the set of complete contracts whose induced investment
game possesses the unique Nash equilibrium.
To sum up, the timing of the events is portrayed below:
Date 0 Date 1 Date 2 Date 3
Contract f Investment e τi received by i Action aτ
2.2 Welfare-Neutral complete contracts
This paper will be particularly concerned with complete contracts that are welfare-
neutral. The interim payoff of agent i generated by a complete contract f when his
type is τi is given:
Ui ( f |τi ) ≡
∑
τ˜∈T
p
(
τ˜ | τ˜i = τi , e∗( f )
)
ui ( f (τ˜ ); τ˜ ) − ci
(
e∗i ( f )
)
.
Let X∗ be the set of all mappings x˜(·) with the property that x˜(τ ) ∈ X τ for any
τ ∈ T . Two types τi and τ ′i are said to be equivalent (τi ∼ τ ′i ) if there exist α > 0
and β ∈ R such that, for each x˜ ∈ X∗ and each yi ∈ Yi ,
Ui (x˜, yi |τi ) = αUi
(
x˜, yi |τ ′i
) + β.
That is, two types are equivalent if the interim cardinal preferences over all complete
contracts are the same. This paper requires that a complete contract always result in
the same interim payoffs between these equivalent types. (After all, it is only payoffs
that matter).
A complete contract f : T → A is welfare-neutral if, for every i ∈ N , whenever
τi ∼ τ ′i , there exist α > 0 and β ∈ R such that
Ui ( f |τi ) = αUi
( f |τ ′i
) + β.
Welfare-neutrality is not an innocuous assumption but fairly weak one in the standard
incomplete contracts environment.
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3 The case of indescribability
3.1 Indescribable states
I would like to know what can be achieved when the states are indescribable. If parties
are able to perform dynamic programming, then the very least they can formulate
a probability distribution over the possible interim payoffs.7 To represent possible
interim payoffs, let
Vi : Z × Yi → R,
be a “number-based” interim payoff function for agent i , where Z is an abstract set,
which will be endowed with enumerability. The only difference between Vi and an
ordinary interim payoff function Ui (·, yi |τi ) is that, in the former, the domain of com-
plete contracts has been replaced by this set of Z . The set Z is a dummy index reflecting
the fact that agents cannot forecast physical actions. This paper deviates from the lit-
erature by allowing the agents to have asymmetric information at the trading stage.
On the other hand, this paper follows the literature by assuming that whether or not a
given action is feasible can be verified at the trading stage. In other words, for any state
τ ∈ T , the set of actions at state τ, X τ should be part of each player i’s description of
the state τi : For any τ ∈ T , I essentially assume
X τ =
⋃
τ ′∈T s.t. τ ′1=τ1
X τ
′ =
⋃
τ ′∈T s.t. τ ′2=τ2
X τ
′
.
Viewed this way, a state τ can alternatively be expressed as (X τ , V τ , ϕτ ), where:
1. X τ is the (physical) action space compatible with state τ , where |X τ | = kτ ;
2. V τ = (V τ11 , V τ22 ), where V τii : K τ × Yi → R constitutes agent i’s number-based
interim payoff function and K τ = {1, . . . , kτ };
3. ϕτ : K τ → X τ is a mapping from numbers into the action space. That is, associ-
ated with yi ∈ Yi , ϕτ (k) implements the interim payoff vector V τii (k, yi ) in type
τi : Ui (ϕτ (k), yi |τi ) = V τii (k, yi ) for all yi ∈ Yi and i ∈ N . The function ϕτ can
be interpreted as a deciphering key.
Here | · | stands for the cardinality of a set. I let V = V1 × V2 denote the set of
possible interim number-based payoff functions V = (V1, V2) where V1 ∈ V1 and
V2 ∈ V2.
When I say that agents can perform dynamic programming in the case of indescrib-
able states, I mean that they can formulate prior belief pˆ(V |e) about how states affect
interim payoffs. Beliefs pˆ are consistent with beliefs in the describable states model
if, for all V ∈ V and all e ∈ E ,
7 Maskin and Tirole (1999) instead look at the possible ex post payoffs because they focus on symmetric
information at the trading stage.
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pˆ(V |e) =
∑
τ∈TV
p(τ |e),
where TV = {τ ∈ T |V τ ≡ U τ ◦ ϕ = V for some deciphering key ϕ}.
3.2 Number-Based contracts
When actions are no longer describable in advance, parties cannot pre-specify the
action they would like to implement in each state. However, they can in principle
pre-specify the interim utilities they would like to implement. I call
fˆ : V → Z × Y,
a number-based contract, where for any number-based interim payoff functions V,
fˆ (V ) specifies an integer z ∈ Z and a describable action yi ∈ Yi for each i ∈ N such
that (V1(z, y1), V2(z, y2)) are the corresponding interim utilities to be implemented.
A number-based contract fˆ is said to be welfare-neutral if, for each i ∈ N , whenever
τi ∼ τ ′i , there exist α > 0 and β ∈ R such that
V τii
(
kτ , yτii
) = αV τ ′ii
(
kτ ′ , yτ
′
i
i
)
+ β
where fˆ (V τ11 , V τ22 ) = (kτ , yτ11 , yτ22 ) and fˆ (V
τ ′1
1 , V
τ ′2
2 ) = (kτ
′
, yτ
′
1
1 , y
τ ′2
2 ).
The number-based contract fˆ corresponds to the complete contract f : T → A,
if for all i ∈ N , all Vi ∈ Vi , and for all τi ∈ Ti such that V τii = Vi ,
Vi
( fˆ ) = Ui ( f |τi ).
It is routine to verify that a complete contract f is welfare-neutral if and only if there
exists a welfare-neutral number-based contract corresponding to f .
3.3 Mechanisms
As long as the complete contract f is welfare-neutral, my task is to ensure that the
set of conditions under which the interim utilities prescribed by the corresponding
number-based contract fˆ actually get implemented. There are two difficulties for this:
(1) the true number-based interim payoff functions V τ are private information and (2)
the true deciphering key ϕτ is not verifiable. Recall that V τ and ϕτ are introduced in
Sect. 3.1. Accordingly, fˆ must be implemented indirectly. This is where I make use
of implementation theory.
Let  = (M, g) be a mechanism. Here M = M1 × M2 refers to the set of message
profile m = (m1, m2). The outcome function g : M → A assigns to each message
profile m an alternative g(m) ∈ A. Given an arbitrary prior p, a mechanism induces a
Bayesian game (p) in which each agent’s type is his signal, and after observing his
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signal, agent i selects a message from the set Mi . A strategy in (p) for agent i is a
rule σi : Ti → Mi . A strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) lists a strategy for each agent.
The interim payoff of agent i generated by a Bayesian game (p) when a strategy
profile σ is played and his type is τi is given:
Ui (g ◦ σ |τi ) ≡
∑
τ˜ j ∈T j
p(τ˜ j , τi |e∗(g ◦ σ))ui (g(σ (τ˜ j , τi )); τ˜ j , τi ) − ci (e∗i (g ◦ σ)).
A strategy profile σ is said to be a Bayesian (Nash) equilibrium of the game (p)
if for each agent i , state τ , and message mi ,
Ui (g ◦ σ |τi ) ≥ Ui (g ◦ (mi , σ j )|τi ).
A mechanism  = (M, g) is said to implement a complete contract f in Bayes-
ian equilibrium if, for all τ ∈ T , the following two conditions hold: (1) there is a
Bayesian equilibrium whose outcome coincides with f (τ ) and (2) for every Bayesian
equilibrium σ , we have g(σ (τ )) = f (τ ). A complete contract f is said to be Bayesian
implementable if there exists a mechanism  that implements f in Bayesian equilib-
rium. If a complete contract f is welfare-neutral, it is not difficult to show that f is
Bayesian implementable if and only if every Bayesian equilibrium interim utilities
(not physical outcomes) in each state is the same as those prescribed by f . Thus, I
say that a number-based contract fˆ is Bayesian implementable if it corresponds to a
welfare-neutral complete contract f that is Bayesian implementable.8
4 To the extent indescribability does not matter
To state the extended irrelevance theorem, I propose the following assumption.
Assumption A 1. There exist a describable alternative x0 ∈ ⋂τ∈T X τ and transfer
y0 ∈ Y .
2. For any two complete contracts f and f ′ and any i ∈ N , there exists yi ∈ R such
that
Ui ( f ′|τi ) > Ui
( fX , fYi − yi |τi
)
for all τi ∈ Ti ,
where fX : T → X and fYi : T → Yi .
Assumption A1 implies that there is always the no-trade outcome as a describable
option. Assumption A2 requires that given any two complete contracts, there exists
(potentially large) monetary transfer which compensates agents from a switch from
one contract to the other. These assumptions are basically satisfied in the incomplete
contracting literature.
8 When physical outcomes cannot be described in advance, the best we can do is to ensure that equilibrium
utilities are the same as those prescribed by the contract.
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The interim payoff of agent i attainable from the no trade outcome (x0, y0) when
his type is τi is given:
Ui
(
x0, y0i |τi
) ≡
∑
τ˜ j ∈Tj
p
(
τ˜ j , τi |e∗(x0, y0)
)
ui
(
x0, y0i ; τ˜ j , τi
) − ci
(
e∗i (x0, y0)
)
.
I shall define f to be individually rational at the trading stage.9
Definition 1 f is (interim) individually rational if
Ui ( f |τi ) ≥ Ui
(
x0, y0i |τi
)
for all τi ∈ Ti and i ∈ N .
I extend MT’s irrelevance theorem to the environments in which there is symmetric
information at the contracting stage but asymmetric information at the trading stage.
This extension is important because Kunimoto (2008) shows that the irrelevance the-
orem is no longer valid when there is asymmetric information at both the contracting
stage and the trading stage.10
Theorem 1 (Extended irrelevance theorem) Suppose Assumption A holds. If the num-
ber-based contract fˆ corresponds to a complete contract f that is welfare-neutral,
Bayesian implementable, and individually rational, then fˆ can be implemented in sub-
game perfect equilibrium even when the states are indescribable at the contracting
stage.
Proof of Theorem 1 The proof builds on standard implementation theory. In the imple-
mentation literature, the objective is to construct mechanisms that elicit agents’ payoffs
when the action space is known in advance but payoffs are neither known ex ante nor
verifiable ex post. We show that such mechanisms can be extended to the case in which
the action space cannot be forecast. Specifically, after the state τ is realized, we have
agent 1 announce what he claims are (1) the realized action set, denoted X and (2) a
mechanism X that, given X , implements the number-based contract fˆ (the existence
of an implementing mechanism is assured in the Appendix). We then allow agent 2 to
challenge either announcement. Because we assume (as does the incomplete contracts
literature) that courts can verify at the trading stage whether or not any given action is
feasible (See Sect. 3.1), it is easy for agent 2 to challenge successfully agent 1 if he had
omitted a feasible action from X or included an infeasible one. Moreover, assuming
that X is the true action space, agent 2 can mechanically prove when a mechanism
X fails to implement fˆ by simply exhibiting a suboptimal equilibrium (which also
constitutes a successful challenge). The incentive for agent 2 to challenge successfully
is that she is then rewarded with the opportunity to receive a potentially large monetary
transfer from agent 1 to agent 2 (this deters agent 1 from announcing a false action
9 When there is symmetric information at the trading stage, individual rationality reduces to ex post indi-
vidual rationality which is needed for MT’s irrelevance theorem.
10 In the light of Theorem 1, Maskin and Tirole (1999) show that when there is symmetric information at
the trading stage, Bayesian implementability is a vacuous constraint.
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space or non-implementing mechanism). If agent 2 does not challenge—which will
occur only if agent 1’s claim is true—the mechanism X is then played.
Note first that, since ui (·) is strictly increasing in money and Ti is finite, there exists
y00 ∈ Y such that
Ui
(
x0, y00i |τi
)
< Ui
(
x0, y0i |τi
)
for all τi ∈ Ti and all i ∈ N .
Given the action space X , a mechanism X = (M1 × M2, gX ) is said to be suc-
cessful provided that, for all possible pairs of number-based interim payoff functions
V ∈ V for which |X | = |Z | and all possible deciphering keys ϕ : Z → X , the unique
Bayesian equilibrium interim payoffs of the game X (p) when agents have interim
utility functions (V1(ϕ−1(·), ·), V2(ϕ−1(·), ·)) are V ( fˆ ), where ϕ−1 : X → Z .
For the time being, suppose that, for all X for which there exists τ ∈ T with
X τ = X , there exists a successful mechanism. Then the parties can sign a contract
that stipulates that, once the state is realized:
1. agent 1 proposes a mechanism X = (M, gX );
2. agent 2 can accept the proposal or challenge it;
3. if agent 2 challenges, then she demonstrates that the proposed mechanism X is
not successful;
4. if agent 2 succeeds with the challenge, then she can name any money transfer
(y1, y2) with y1+y2 = 0. After this monetary transfer is made, the mechanism X
is played; if she fails with the challenge, the outcome (x0, y00) is implemented;
in either case, the execution of the contract ends at this point;
5. if agent 2 accepts agent 1’s proposal, then the mechanism X is played and the
action that this leads to is implemented.
We claim that, for each τ ∈ T , the unique equilibrium interim payoffs of this
contract are (V τ11 ( fˆ ), V τ22 ( fˆ )). To see this, note that if agent 1 proposes a corre-
sponding successful mechanism X = (M, gX ) and if agent 2 accepts, then, by
definition of “successful mechanism,” the resulting continuation equilibrium interim
payoffs are indeed (V τ11 ( fˆ ), V τ22 ( fˆ )). Moreover, it is uniquely optimal for agent 2
to accept this proposal, since any challenge would fail and therefore result in out-
come (x0, y00), which from individual rationality of the corresponding f , is worse
than V τ22 ( fˆ ). It remains only to show that in equilibrium agent 1 must make such a
proposal and agent 2 always has an incentive to challenge agent 1’s “unsuccessful”
mechanism. Observe that if agent 1 did not make such a proposal, then agent 2 could
challenge successfully (either by showing that X is not the true feasible action set or
by exhibiting number-based interim payoff functions (V1, V2) ∈ V , a deciphering key
ϕ, and a Bayesian equilibrium of X (p) when agents have interim utility functions
(V1(ϕ−1(·), ·), V2(ϕ−1(·), ·)) such that agents’ Bayesian equilibrium interim payoffs
are not V ( fˆ ). Moreover, by doing so, Assumption A2 guarantees that agent 2 could
get a strictly higher interim payoff than V τ22 ( fˆ ). Thus, agent 2 always has an incentive
to challenge agent 1’s “unsuccessful” mechanism. On the other hand, since utility
function is strictly increasing in money, agent 1 then would get an interim payoff
strictly less than V τ11 ( fˆ ), a suboptimal outcome. Hence, agent 1 has an incentive to
propose a “successful” mechanism.
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To complete the proof, we must show that, for all τ ∈ T , there exists a successful
mechanism Xτ . To do this, our job is reduced to checking the sufficient conditions
for Bayesian implementation (Mookherjee and Reichelstein 1990) are satisfied. We
relegate this part of the proof to the Appendix. unionsq
5 Illustration
I would like to illustrate the concepts introduced in Sect. 3 and the main result in
Sect. 4 through an example. Suppose that a buyer (B) and a seller (S) can trade a
single indivisible good that the seller will produce and the buyer will consume. Let
T = {τ, τh} be the set of types of the seller. I assume that the seller is informed of
the state at the trading stage, while the buyer keeps remaining uninformed. Here I can
ignore the buyer’s type because he is completely uninformed. The value to the buyer
and the cost to the seller (in terms of money) that they assign to the good in state τ
are denoted vB(τ ) and cS(τ ), respectively, and suppose
vB(τ) = 0 and vB(τh) = 15
cS(τ) = 1 and cS(τh) = 10.
The set of feasible allocations Aτ at state τ ∈ T is defined as follows:
Aτ = X τ × Y τ
where X τ and Y τ will be defined momentarily. X τ is defined as:
X τ = {x(τ ) ∈ {0, 1}}
where for each τ = τ, τh, x(τ ) = 0 stands for the case where the good is not pro-
duced at state τ and x(τ ) = 1 stands for the case where the good is produced and
delivered to the buyer at state τ . Y τ is defined as:
Y τ = {y(τ )| y(τ ) ∈ {0, 7}}
where y(τ ) denotes the monetary transfer from the buyer to the seller at state τ .11
I can define each agent’s state-dependent ex post utility corresponding to a complete
contract f (·) = (x(τ), x(τh), y(τ), y(τh)) such that for each τ ,
u B( f (τ ); τ) =
{
15 − y(τ ) if τ = τh and x(τ ) = 1
−y(τ ) if τ = τ
uS( f (τ ); τ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
y(τ ) − 10 if τ = τh and x(τ ) = 1
y(τ ) − 1 if τ = τ and x(τ ) = 1
y(τ ) if x(τ ) = 0
11 The restrictive nature of Y τ (which takes only two values here) is assumed for purely expository purpose.
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I assume that only the seller makes an investment eS which increases the proba-
bility that the good entails high value. There are only two levels of investment: either
eS = 1 (investment) or eS = 0 (no investment). The cost of investment c(eS) (in terms
of money) is given as
c(eS) =
{
1 if eS = 1
0 if eS = 0
It is common knowledge that the likelihood and the way these states of the world
depend upon the seller’s investment:
p(τh |eS = 1) = 2/3
p(τ|eS = 1) = 1/3 and
p(τh |eS = 0) = 1/2
p(τ|eS = 0) = 1/2
Thus, X τ = X (state independent) for any τ = τ, τh . Define Z = {1, 2, . . . , 16}
as the dummy index. Define a deciphering key ϕ : Z → A as follows:
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
x(τ) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
x(τh) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
y(τ) 0 0 7 7 0 0 7 7 0 0 7 7 0 0 7 7
y(τh) 0 7 0 7 0 7 0 7 0 7 0 7 0 7 0 7
ϕ(k) ϕ(1) ϕ(2) ϕ(3) ϕ(4) ϕ(5) ϕ(6) ϕ(7) ϕ(8) ϕ(9) ϕ(10) ϕ(11) ϕ(12) ϕ(13) ϕ(14) ϕ(15) ϕ(16)
Define VB : Z → R and V τS : Z → R for each τ = τ, τh as the interim num-
ber-based payoff functions. Define VS = {V τS , V τhS } and V = VB × VS . The interim
utilities are given as below:
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
e∗S 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
VB(k) 0 −7/2 −7/2 −7 10 16/3 23/3 3 0 −7/2 −7/2 −7 10 23/3 23/3 3
V τS (k) 0 0 7 7 −1 −1 6 6 −1 6 6 6 −2 −2 5 5
V τhS (k) 0 7 0 7 −11 −4 −11 −4 0 0 0 7 −11 5 −11 −4
It can be checked that V τS and V
τh
S are not positive affine transformations of one
another. Therefore, every number-based contract fˆ : {V τS , V τhS } → Z is welfare-neu-
tral. Theorem 1 of this paper shows that welfare-neutrality is the only constraint due
to indescribability, while the other constraints (such as Bayesian implementability)
remain the same regardless of whether or not the states are indescribable.
Finally, I shall claim that the only no-investment-no-trade contract f (i.e., f (·) =
(x(τ), x(τh), y(τ), y(τh)) = (0, 0, 0, 0) and e∗S( f ) = 0) can be implementable
even when the states are describable. This is indeed an incomplete contract but is
merely derived from the standard adverse selection problem. More importantly, albeit
its simple structure of the example, indescribability is shown to be irrelevant for this
contractual incompleteness.
Assume that S makes an investment (eS = 1) and there is trade at τh (x(τh) = 1).
When S′s type is τh , individual rationality for τh requires that y(τh) ≥ 10 + 1 = 11.
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Incentive compatibility for S requires that y(τh) = y(τ) ≥ 11. In this case, B’s
interim payoff is 2/3 × 15 − y(τh). Thus, individual rationality for B requires that
y(τ) = y(τh) ≤ 10. This is inconsistent with y(τh) ≥ 11 and therefore I must have
y(τh) = y(τ) = 0. Then, individual rationality for S with each type requires that
x(τh) = x(τ) = 0. Given (x(τh), x(τ), y(τh), y(τ)) = (0, 0, 0, 0), it is optimal
for S to not make investment. On the other hand, assume that S makes no invest-
ment (eS = 0) but there is trade at τh (x(τh) = 0). When S’s type is τh , individual
rationality for τh requires that y(τh) ≥ 10. Incentive compatibility for S requires that
y(τh) = y(τ) ≥ 10. In this case, B’s interim payoff is 1/2 × 15 − y(τh). Indi-
vidual rationality for B requires that y(τh) ≤ 7.5, which contradicts y(τh) ≥ 10. If
y(τh) ≤ 7.5, individual rationality for τh requires that x(τh) = 0. Given x(τh) = 0,
individual rationality for B requires that y(τh) = y(τ) = 0. Finally, individual ratio-
nality for τ requires that x(τ) = 0. Given this, it is indeed optimal for S to not make
investment (eS = 0).
6 Concluding remarks
This paper shows that indescribability by itself imposes no additional restriction on the
set of implementable contracts, even in the presence of asymmetric information at the
trading stage. Relying on their irrelevance theorems, MT argued that bounded rational-
ity is an essential ingredient for contractual incompleteness. On the other hand, Segal
(1999) (in Theorem 2) proposed (partial) indescribability even at the trading stage
as a reason for contractual incompleteness in an otherwise standard rational agents
model. This paper, in combination with Kunimoto (2008), offers a different proposal:
if we show that agents’ ability to foresee future payoffs together with inability to
describe physical contingencies can generate additional contractual incompleteness,
then asymmetric information at the contracting stage should be considered essential
for contractual incompleteness. For example, this asymmetric information might be
viewed as the agents’ previous experiences to the current situation.
This paper takes indescribability as an exogenous constraint. However, this con-
straint can be endogenously derived from limited communication between the parties.
In general, the acts of formulating and absorbing the content of communication are
privately costly: the sender’s communication effort and the receiver’s attention effort
are needed for effective communication.12 For example, I assume that before the con-
tracting stage, the parties’ efforts jointly determine the probability q that the sender’s
information is properly assimilated by the receiver; with probability 1−q, the informa-
tion cannot be substantiated. Here, the content of the communication is the “physical”
details of the states. Thus, the current paper takes “describability” as a special case in
which q = 1 no matter what efforts the agents exert and “indescribability” as another
special case in which it is infinitely costly for each agent to make q positive.
As a final remark, I do not claim that the mechanism constructed in this paper will
be employed in real contracting situations. Rather, this mechanism should be used to
determine which allocations are consistent with contracting by “rational” agents and
12 See Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) for the detail of this type of argument.
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which are not. The contribution of the current paper lies in clarifying where bounded
rationality and/or other considerations will be important for explaining contractual
incompleteness.
Appendix
In what follows, I will develop the notions needed for Bayesian implementation based
on Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1990). I will start by introducing a special class of
mechanisms. By a revelation mechanism I set Mi = Ti for all i ∈ N . For any com-
plete contract f , the induced revelation mechanism (T , f ) will be denoted by  f .
The interim payoff of agent i generated by a Bayesian game  f (p) if agent i sends
τ ′i to the mechanism while his true type is τi is given:
Ui
( f |τi , τ ′i
) ≡
∑
τ˜ j ∈T j
p
(
τ˜ j , τi |e∗( f )
)
ui
( f (τ˜ j , τ ′i
); τ˜ j , τi
) − ci (e∗i ( f )).
The interim payoff of agent i generated by a Bayesian game  f (p) when agent i
tells the truth as his message is denoted as follows:
Ui ( f |τi ) ≡ Ui ( f |τi , τi ).
I define f to be incentive compatible at the trading stage.
Definition 2 A complete contract f is incentive compatible if
Ui ( f |τi ) ≥ Ui
( f |τi , τ ′i
)
for all τi , τ ′i ∈ Ti , and i ∈ N .
f is incentive compatible if and only if telling the truth constitutes a Bayesian
equilibrium of the revelation mechanism  f . Due to the standard revelation principle,
incentive compatibility is a necessary conditions for Bayesian implementation. I will
introduce a much richer class of mechanisms below:
Definition 3 An augmented revelation mechanism is a mechanism  = (M, g) such
that for all i ∈ N , Mi = Ti ∪ Bi , where Bi is an arbitrary set.
In the above definition, Bi represents the set of additional message options made
available to agent i , in addition to messages about his type. See the result below.
Theorem 2 (Mookherjee and Reichelstein 1990) If f : T → A is Bayesian imple-
mentable, then f is implementable in Bayesian equilibrium by an augmented revela-
tion mechanism, in which truthful reporting is an equilibrium.
This is what Mookherjee and Reichelstein call the Augmented Revelation Princi-
ple: If this revelation mechanism admits an equilibrium which results in undesired
outcomes, it must be true that some agent has a non-type message (in the augmented
mechanism) which eliminates this suboptimal equilibrium without upsetting the
truth-telling equilibrium. I need two definitions to state another necessary condition
for Bayesian implementation.
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Definition 4 A Bayesian equilibrium σ in a revelation mechanism  f can be selec-
tively eliminated if there exist i ∈ N and h : T j → A ( j = i) with the following two
properties:
1. Ui (h ◦ σ j |τ¯i ) > Ui ( f ◦ σ |τ¯i ) for some τ¯i ∈ Ti ,
2. Ui ( f |τi ) ≥ Ui (h|τi ) for all τi ∈ Ti .
In the above definition, agent i is offered a new message option, which Mookherjee
and Reichelstein refer to as a “flag”. When agent i chooses the flag rather than a type
message, and other agent j report τ j , the outcome chosen by the mechanism is given
by h(τ j ). The first condition in the above definition says that agent i prefers to deviate
from σi to the flag in some state, thereby destroying σ as an equilibrium. However,
the second condition ensures that agent i does not deviate from truth-telling to the
flag, provided that the other agent j is also truthful. The truthful equilibrium is thus
preserved.
Definition 5 The revelation mechanism  f satisfies the selective elimination condi-
tion if every Bayesian equilibrium σ in  f satisfying f ◦ σ = f can be selectively
eliminated.
Here f ◦ σ = f if f (σ (τ )) = f (τ ) for each τ ∈ T and f ◦ σ = f otherwise.
Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1990) show that incentive compatibility and the selec-
tive elimination conditions are necessary for Bayesian implementation.
Finally, I am ready to state the sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation
for the number-based contracts.
Theorem 3 Suppose Assumption A holds and the number-based contract fˆ corre-
sponds to a welfare-neutral complete contract f . Then, fˆ is Bayesian implementable
if there exists an incentive compatible revelation mechanism  f which satisfies the
selective elimination condition relative to f .
Proof of Theorem 3 We deal with a specified set X and so standard implementation
theory applies. Let us assume that for any i ∈ N , any Vi ∈ Vi with Vi : Z × Yi → R,
for any X for which |Z | = |X |, and for any deciphering key ϕ : Z → X , there exists
τi ∈ Ti such that
Ui (·, ·|τi ) = Vi
(
ϕ−1(·), ·).
This condition was not hypothesized. However, if it is violated, then there are fewer
payoff functions to deal with, and so implementation is all the easier. That is, the claim
holds a fortiori. For any X , let T X1 × T X2 ≡ T X = {τ ∈ T |X τ = X}.
The proof proceeds inductively. We start with the revelation mechanism Xf =
((T X1 , T X2 ), f ). Since f is incentive compatible, the truth-telling is a Bayesian equi-
librium of the revelation mechanism Xf . In the rest of the argument, we selectively
eliminate its suboptimal equilibria by augmenting Xf . The resulting augmented mech-
anism will have no new equilibria. If there are any suboptimal equilibria remaining,
we construct another augmentation. At any given stage, we begin with an augmented
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mechanism X in which the truth-telling is an equilibrium, and all equilibria involve
“type” messages only. At the next stage, we obtain ¯X , an augmentation of X , which
possesses the above properties and has at least one less suboptimal equilibrium. Since
Xf can have at most a finite number of equilibria, a finite number of augmentations
will achieve the desired mechanism.
We describe a representative stage of this iterative procedure. Suppose we start with
X = (M, g), an augmentation of Xf with the following properties:
• Mi = T Xi ∪ Bi for each i ∈ N ;• g(m) ∈ X × Y for each m ∈ M ;
• For every equilibrium σ of X , σi (τi ) ∈ T Xi for each τi ∈ T Xi and each i ∈ N .
Let σ be a suboptimal equilibrium of X and suppose that agent 1 is the agent des-
ignated by the selective elimination condition relative to f . Consider the mechanism
¯X = (M¯, g¯) with:
• M¯1 = M1 ∪ F L;
• M¯2 = M2 ∪ {CFL1, . . . , CFLk2}, where k2 = |T X2 |.
Thus, agent 1 is given a new message called “flag,” denoted F L , and agent 2 is given
a set of corresponding messages called “counterflags”. Naturally, outcomes associated
with messages in the previous stage are left unchanged. Outcomes associated with the
new messages satisfy the following four rules:
1. If agent 1 chooses F L and agent 2 chooses type message, then the outcome is
given by h(τ2) = (xh(τ2), yh1 (τ2), yh2 (τ2)) where h is provided by the selective
elimination condition corresponding to the equilibrium σ . Here xh : T X2 → X
and yhi : T X2 → Yi for each i ∈ N . This gives rise to:
g¯(m) = g(m) for all m ∈ M
g¯(F L , τ2) = h(τ2) ∀ τ2 ∈ T X2 ,
where h(τ2) =
(
xh(τ2), yh1 (τ2), y
h
2 (τ2)
)
2. If agent 1 chooses the current flag and agent 2 is choosing a previous flag or
counterflag, then every agent is treated as if agent 1 had reported τ 11 instead of
F L except that agent 1 is charged ε > 0 for choosing F L .
g¯1(F L , b2) =
(
gx
(
τ 11 , b2
)
, gy1
(
τ 11 , b2
) − ε) ∀ b2 ∈ B2
g¯2(F L , b2) = g2
(
τ 11 , b2
) ∀ b2 ∈ B2
Here we shall use the notation g(m) = (g1(m), g2(m)); gi (m) = (gx (m), gyi (m))
for each i ∈ N .
3. If agent 2 raises a new CFL j , but agent 1 does not choose FL, we have two cases:
(a) If agent 1 chooses a message b1 ∈ B1, then the outcome is as if agent 2 had
announced τ j2 instead of CFL j ; (b) If agent 1 chooses τ1 ∈ T X1 , agent 2 is treated
as if agent 2 had announced τ j2 , except that agent 2 is charged ε > 0. The same
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principle applies to agent 1, except that he gets the private transfer y∗1 (τ
j
2 ) > 0
(to be determined below) if he announces τ 11 .
g¯
(
b1, CFL j
) = g(b1, τ j2
)
g¯1
(
τ 11 , CFL
j ) = (gx
(
τ 11 , τ
j
2
)
, y∗1
(
τ
j
2
))
g¯1
(
τ k1 , CFL
j ) = g1
(
τ k1 , τ
j
2
)
for k = 1
g¯2
(
τ1, CFL j
) = (gx
(
τ1, τ
j
2
)
, gy2
(
τ1, τ
j
2
) − ε)
We use Assumption A2 to choose y∗1 (τ
j
2 ) big enough such that for all τ1 ∈ T X1 :
V τ11
(
ϕ−1
(
gx
(
τ 11 , τ
j
2
)
, y∗1
(
τ
j
2
)))
> V τ11
(
ϕ−1
(
g
(
F L , τ j2
)))
and
y∗1
(
τ
j
2
)
> gy1
(
τ 11 , τ
j
2
)
4. Finally, if F L meets CFL j , we apply the following rule with the reward δ > 0 to
agent 2:
g¯1(F L , CFL j ) = g¯1
(
F L , τ j2
)
g¯2(F L , CFL j ) =
(
g¯x
(
F L , τ j2
)
, g¯y2
(
F L , τ j2
) + δ)
This completes the specification of the augmented mechanism ¯X . The proof is
established by the following claims, which state that σ is not an equilibrium in ¯X ,
and that there is no equilibrium in ¯X where agents 1 and 2 choose any of their new
message options.
Claim 1 σ is not an equilibrium in ¯X .
Proof of Claim 1 Note first that σi (τi ) ∈ T Xi for all τi ∈ T Xi and all i ∈ N . Given
Rule 2 and the selective elimination condition for f , agent 1 has an incentive to raise
a flag. This implies that σ is not an equilibrium. unionsq
To establish that there are no new equilibria we introduce the following notation.
Let p∗ ≡ min {p(τ j |τi , e∗( f )) | i = j, p(τ j |τi , e∗( f )) > 0} denote the minimum
positive probability assigned by a type of one agent to a type of the other agent. Since
the set of types is finite, it is clear that p∗ is well defined and strictly positive. Then,
it follows that
1. For any τ1 ∈ T X1 , there exists τ2 ∈ T X2 such that p(τ1|τ2, e∗( f )) > 0.
2. For any τ1 ∈ T X1 and τ2 ∈ T X2 , p(τ2|τ1, e∗( f )) > 0 if and only if p(τ1|τ2, e∗
( f )) > 0.13
13 The common prior assumption, more precisely, the common support assumption, is important for this
property to hold.
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Claim 2 There does not exist an equilibrium in ¯X where any type of agent 1 chooses
FL.
Proof of Claim 2 Suppose, on the contrary, that there is such an equilibrium. Let
T ∗1 ⊂ T X1 denote the set of types τ1 of agent 1 that choose F L in some equilibrium.
Let T ∗2 ⊂ T X2 denote the set of types τ2 of agent 2 that assign positive probability to
the event that agent 1’s type is in T ∗1 . Since types in T ∗2 assign at least probability p∗
that agent 1 is choosing F L , every type τ2 ∈ T ∗2 will prefer CFL j to τ2, provided ε
(used in Rule 2) is sufficiently small relative to δ (used in Rule 3). Hence in the given
equilibrium, every type τ2 ∈ T ∗2 will choose either some CFL j , or messages in B2.
Since p(τ2|τ1, e∗( f )) > 0 if and only if p(τ1|τ2, e∗( f )) > 0, any type τ1 ∈ T ∗1
assigns probability one to the event that agent 2’s type is in T ∗2 , and therefore that agent
2 is choosing either some CFL j or messages in B2. If agent 2 chooses messages in
B2, Rule 2 dictates that agent 1 can avoid penalty ε by choosing τ 11 . If agent 2 chooses
CFLτ2 , Rule 3 dictates that agent 1 is better off by choosing τ 11 instead of F L . It then
follows that every type τ1 ∈ T ∗1 will choose τ 11 instead of F L . This is a contradiction.unionsq
Claim 3 There is no equilibrium in ¯X where some type of agent 2 chooses some
CFL j .
Proof of Claim 3 We argue by contradiction. Using Claim 2, it suffices to consider
any equilibrium β¯ in ¯X where no type of agent 1 ever uses FL, but there is a non-
empty set T ∗2 ⊂ T X2 of types of agent 2 choosing some CFL j . It then follows that
given any τ2 ∈ T ∗2 , every type τ1 of agent 1 who is assigned positive probability by τ2
(i.e., p(τ1|τ2, e∗( f )) > 0) must be choosing a message b1 ∈ B1. Otherwise, we must
consider the case in which agent 1 chooses a type message τ1 ∈ T X1 . Then, Rule 3
dictates that type τ2 of agent 2 would be better off reporting τ2 instead of CFL j , and
thereby avoid the ε-charge imposed whenever agent 1 chooses type messages in T X1 .
We now argue that the strategy profile β obtained from β¯ by replacing the message
CFL j with τ j2 is an equilibrium in the previous stage mechanism X . Since any type
of agent 2 choosing CFL j in β¯ assigns probability one to the event that agent 1 is
choosing some “non-type” messages in B1, Rule 1 and Rule 3 imply that all types of
agent 2 are playing best responses at β in X .
It remains to show that there is no type of agent 1 that can profitably deviate from
β in X . Rule 3 requires that announcing any message other than τ 11 induces the same
payoffs for agent 1 in β (in X ) as in β¯ (in ¯X ). Suppose that type τ1 of agent 1 chooses
τ 11 in both β and β¯. Because of Rule 1 and Rule 3 and the construction of the private
transfer y∗1 (τ
j
2 ), the payoff of agent 1 of type τ1 is uniformly lower in β compared
to β¯. For any type of agent 1 that does not choose τ 11 in β¯ (in ¯X ), it therefore does
not pay to deviate to τ 11 in β (in X ). Finally, consider a type τ1 of agent 1 that does
not choose the payoff message τ 11 in β¯ (in ¯X ). By the above reasoning, that type τ1
will assign zero probability to the event that agent 2 chooses some CFL j . Hence, the
payoffs in β associated with all possible messages in M1, including τ 11 , are exactly
what they were in β¯.
In summary, we have established that an equilibrium β¯ involving some CFL j ’s
but not F L would give rise to a corresponding equilibrium β in the previous stage
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mechanism X in which τ j2 is substituted for CFL j . However, in this equilibrium,
some types of agent 1 must be choosing “non-type” messages in B1, a contradiction
to our initial hypothesis that every equilibrium in X involves type messages only.
unionsq
Since the set T is finite, there can only be a finite number of equilibria in Xf ,
requiring only a finite number of augmentation stages to eliminate all suboptimal
equilibria. Throughout the whole process of augmentations, on the other hand, we
continue to keep the truth-telling as a Bayesian equilibrium. This completes the proof
of Theorem 3. unionsq
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